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National and International Courts -
Deference or Disdain?
M6NICA PINTO*
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC LAW
Far beyond the debates and controversies relating to the
different statuses and origins of both international and domestic
law rules, there is a long standing tradition in the international law
arena whereby states exercise their sovereignty when they enter
into an international agreement and when they feel bound by the
same general practice accepted as law.
International and domestic rules are integrated into the legal
order of every given state. The hierarchy and the relationship
amongst these rules are normally regulated by the state's
Constitution or other fundamental laws. In this context, there is a
long standing practice, according to which every state has the
latitude to choose the means through which international law will
become effective internally. In fact, what actually matters is that it
be applied.
As early as 1925, the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) recognized that there was "a principle which is self-
evident, according to which a State which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such
modifications as may be necessary to secure the fulfillment of the
Professor of International Law and Human Rights Law, University of Buenos Aires Law
School. These ideas took shape for the conference on "International Courts and Tribunals
in the 21st Century: The Future of International Justice" convened by the Project on
International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) at The Hague on 30 November-1 December
2007. I am grateful to my colleagues at PICT and other participants in the conference for
conversations and fruitful debates.
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obligations undertaken."' Shortly thereafter, the same tribunal
stated "it is a generally accepted principle of international law that
in the relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a
treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of
the treaty."2 This same wording can be found in a great number of
other decisions by the PCIJ and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).3 In fact, this generally accepted principle has been codified
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.4 Article 27 of
the treaty states, "A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.'
Some treaties embody special stipulations dealing with the
relationship, between domestic and international law. Human
rights treaties, for example, usually contain a clause whereby state
parties have the duty to take the necessary steps to adopt
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
the protected rights.6 The theory behind these provisions is that
every state party will take the necessary steps to prepare its legal
framework in order to be able to enforce the treaty. Additionally,
these treaty provisions usually leave it to the concerned states to
determine the method of integrating the relevant treaty "in
1. Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21).
2. Greco-Bulgarian "Communities," Advisory Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17,
at 32 (July 31).
3. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
46, 96, at 167 (June 7) ("[W]hile it is certain that France cannot rely on her own legislation
to limit the scope of her international obligations..."); Treatment of Polish Nationals and
Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, 4, at 24 (Feb. 4) [hereinafter Treatment of Polish Nationals,
Advisory Opinion] ("It should be observed that, while on the one hand, according to
generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against another State, on the
provisions of the latter's Constitution, but only on international law and international
obligations duly accepted, on the other hand and conversely, a State cannot adduce as
against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent
upon it under international law or treaties in force."); Applicability of the Obligation to
Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June
1947, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. 77, 12, at 31-32, 47 (Apr. 26) [hereinafter Obligation
to Arbitrate, Advisory Opinion].
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
5. Id. at art. 27.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(2), opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on
Human Rights art. 2(1), July 18,1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145 [hereinafter ACHR].
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accordance with its constitutional processes and with the
provisions of the present Covenant.'
Merely fulfilling the obligation of adopting treaty measures,
however, is not enough. The Inter-American Court on Human
Rights (Inter-American Court), for example, stresses that "[t]he
obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of human rights is
not fulfilled by the existence of a legal system designed to make it
possible to comply with this obligation-it also requires the
government to conduct itself so as to effectively ensure the free
and full exercise of human rights."8 Similarly, the Committee on
Human Rights stated:
[T]he implementation does not depend solely on constitutional
or legislative enactments, which in themselves are often not per
se sufficient. The Committee considers it necessary to draw the
attention of States parties to the fact that the obligation under
the Covenant is not confined to the respect of human rights, but
that States parties have also undertaken to ensure the
enjoyment of these rights to all individuals under their
jurisdiction.
It seems that nearly all international rules are conceived to be
applied or invoked by individuals or corporations" (e.g., treaties
dealing with trade and commerce, navigation, taxation, technical
cooperation, etc.) even when the issue of implementing
international rules at the domestic level becomes more sensitive
when the right and/or duty holders are individuals (e.g., human
rights treaties). Consequently, there should be a legal possibility to
materialize the rights and duties embodied in an international
instrument or recognized by an international customary rule.
This article will discuss the relationship between national and
international courts, be it deference or disdain, and will advance
some thoughts on the treatment of national decisions by
international instances and the enforcement of international
7. ICCPR, supra note 6.
8. Veldsquez Rodrfguez v. Honduras Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 167
(July 8, 1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_04_ing.pdf.
9. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., Int'l
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 3: Implementation at the
National Level (art. 2), U.N. Doc. CCPR General Comment No. 3 (July 29, 1981)
[hereinafter ICCPR General Comment No. 3] (emphasis in original).
10. I use this term to refer to all sorts of moral persons of private law.
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decisions by national instances. Special references will be made to
the Human Rights System and to the Inter-American System.
II. NATIONAL DECISIONS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
A. The Supremacy Feeling: How Supreme Are Supreme Courts?
The possibility of being able to seize an international instance
in order to question the conformity of a national judicial
decision -normally from the highest local instance-with the
international obligations undertaken by a state, created a sort of
traumatic event experienced by some national supreme courts of
no longer being supreme. This kind of feeling is usually mixed with
arguments concerning the observance of the principle of res
judicata that has led to peculiar decisions in a great number of
cases.
In November of 2002, the Inter-American Court decided in
Cantos v. Argentina that, "[T]he State [Argentina] shall refrain
from charging Mr. Jos6 Maria Cantos the filing fee and fine levied
for failure to pay the filing fee on time."'" In this case, Mr. Cantos
sued the federal and the provincial governments of Argentina for
money in an amount close to the figures of a national budget and
he was required to pay the judicial fees accordingly. 2 He applied
for an exemption but was not successful. 3 In any case, he
cdntinued to litigate the issue and reached the highest local
instance available, namely the supreme court, without paying any
fees; that is, the failure to pay the filing fees was by no means an
obstacle to exercising his right to justice. The main point, however,
was that the supreme court did not accept the international
decision because of the principle of res judicata.
In fact, the court refused to follow the requirement to enforce
the international judgment by stating that the protection of human
rights can be enforced through the amendment of the
constitutional or legal rules adopted to protect them, but it cannot
take place through acts causing violations of domestic legal order."
11. Cantos v. Argentina Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 97, 70(a) (Nov. 28,
2002), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_97-ing.pdf.
12. Id. 53.
13. Id. I 24(d), 73.
14. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 3/9/1996, "Cantos, Jos6 Maria v. Santiago del
Estero, Provincia de y/o Estado Nacional / cobro de pesos," Revista Juridica La Ley [L.L.]
(1996-C-1099) (Arg.).
[Vol. 30:247250
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The doctrine of res judicata serves an important function in
the legal order. The increasing number of exchanges between
international and domestic law and the ambiguity as to where each
should apply is not meant to introduce any changes in the way res
judicata works. When a state, however, freely accepts a
supervisory mechanism, as in the case of human rights law, or a
judicial or quasi-judicial method for the settlement of disputes, as
in the investment field, and the requisites for the admissibility of
the petitions lodged with the international organs-be them
tribunals lato senso or quasi judicial bodies-include the
exhaustion of local remedies, the scope of the doctrine of res
judicata is different. That is, whenever the international
mechanism is a subsidiary to any local mechanism, res judicata
requires a different reading.
It should be assumed that res judicata has two levels, the first
being preliminary or domestic. Whenever local remedies have
been exhausted or cannot be exhausted because of an exception or
an absence of due diligence, an international instance is available.
The second level of res judicata comes into play when the local
ruling is questioned according to the available international
standards and a decision is reached or when the possibility of
reaching an international mechanism no longer exists. In such
cases, res judicata becomes firm and lasting.
To argue that res judicata prevents the enforcement of an
international binding decision contradicts the sovereign decision of
the political entity that accepted the international jurisdiction. It
also involves a contradiction with the raison d'etre of law; law
actually evolves in order to ensure a better quality of living and
fostering justice is a way to accomplish this goal.
B. International Tribunals (Normally) Have No Competence to
Rule on National Law
There are some arguments suitable to explain why it is
inconvenient to provide international tribunals wide powers to
interpret national judicial decisions and/or domestic law.
From a systemic point of view, there are significant
differences between national and international courts. Local
tribunals exist and work within a judicial context. There is a
division of powers in force and the judiciary, the aristocratic power
in a democratic scheme, is deemed to be a group of highly
qualified men and women, appointed because of their merits and
2008]
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not because of their popularity.5 They are nominated through a
selection process that takes into consideration different criteria.16
They are deemed to be impartial and independent. 7 They are
expected to enforce the rule of law and their decisions are not
necessarily required to meet the standards endorsed by the great
majority of the people. 8 They are subjected to close scrutiny in
how they perform their duties. 9 Their decisions normally can be
questioned before upper instances and there are methods of
accountability for those who wish to settle claims with them if
necessary.
International tribunals, on the other hand, do not belong to
an international judiciary. There is no formal division of powers in
the international society. This by no means can be understood as
denying the existence of different entities performing functions
analogous to those of the legislative and judicial branches of
government.' International tribunals experience the same counter-
majoritarian difficulties22 as domestic judiciaries and are deemed to
be the holders of the same goods as national judges. The
appointment process for international judges, however, is even
more discretional than those of local judges.23 Additionally, the
administrative power is not under any duty to explain the reason
behind a nomination.24 International judges are also deemed to be
independent and impartial even when they are not subjected to
any scrutiny regarding how they perform their duties.25 There are
no accountability methods in force for international judges.26 It
should be noted, however, that this does not mean that all
international judges are uncontrollable. On the contrary,
15. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
187-88 (1996).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. I have discussed these issues in MONICA PINTO, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL:
VIGENCIA Y DESAFfOS EN UN ESCENARIO GLOBALIZADO (2004).
22. Term labeled by Alexander Bickel, quoted by NINO, supra note 15, at 188.
23. See DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO & LEIGH SWIGART, THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE
THE WORLD'S CASES (2007).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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international judges are self-controlled because their job depends
on their performance!27
From the point of view of the regime, national and
international tribunals are also not alike. In fact, international
judges are not empowered to interpret domestic law because
domestic rules are beyond their jurisdictio.28 This does not mean
that they are not allowed to confront national law or national
judicial decisions to come to determine whether they meet
international standards.29  This is an ordinary feature of
international tribunals such as the ICJ, the Committee against
Torture, or ICSID panels. It is simply the judicial assertion of the
international responsibility of States.0
According to the Basic Documents of the Inter-American
System on Human Rights, there should be two supervisory
mechanisms, a Commission and a Court, and both must have
competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of
the commitments made by state parties to the Convention.31 The
scope of their functions in the petition system, however, is not
exactly the same.
The Commission deals with petitions containing
denunciations or complaints of violation of the Convention by a
state party." If a settlement is not reached, the Commission shall,
within the time limit established by its statute, draw up a report
setting forth the facts and stating its conclusions. In transmitting
the report, the Commission may make such proposals and
recommendations as it sees fit."
The Court has jurisdiction over all cases concerning the
interpretation and application of Convention provisions that have
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001); Report of
the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, Report of Int'l
Law Comm'n, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Chap. IV.E.1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) ("Article
1: Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of
that State... Article 2: There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct
consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law;
and (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State").
31. ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 33.
32. Id. at art. 44.
33. Id. at art. 50.
34. Id.
2008]
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been accepted by each state party.35 If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of a protected right or freedom, it shall rule
that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his or her right
or freedom that was violated, and if appropriate, that the
consequence of the measure or situation that constituted the
breach of such right or freedom be remedied' and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party. 7
In this context there are a few slight differences between the
two mechanisms: the Commission always acts first and must set
forth the facts and state its conclusions as to the fulfillment of the
commitments made by the particular state party to the
Convention. That is, according to the Inter-American Court, the
Commission shall verify how, when, where, and through which
means the concerned state fulfilled its duties to respect the rights
and freedoms recognized in the given instrument and to ensure to
all persons subject to its jurisdiction the free and full exercise of
those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination.38 Summing
up, "[t]he Court's reply, then, must be based upon the
Commission's principal function of promoting the observance and
protection of human rights, from which it derives its power to rule,
as in the case of any other act, that a norm of internal law violates
the Convention, but not that it violates the internal juridical order
of a State.""
The Court deals with the interpretation and application of the
provisions of a Convention and if it finds that there has been a
violation of a protected right or freedom, it shall rule the re-
establishment of the exercise of the right and the compensation for
the damage.
Although facts are assigned primarily to the Commission, the
Court is not prevented from dealing with them. Both the
Commission and the Court have to deal with the performance of
their respective duties under the instruments by the State parties,
whether the States have satisfied such obligations or not, and if so,
35. Id. at art. 62(3).
36. Id. at art. 63(l).
37. Id.
38. Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 161.
39. Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts.
41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OC-13/93 (ser. A) No. 13 37 (1993), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea-13-ing.pdf [hereinafter Certain Attributes
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights].
[Vol. 30:247
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through which means. This scope does not allow the supervisory
organs to decide on internal measures, whether they are legislative
or judicial.
International instances, on the other hand, have developed
different mechanisms for dealing with national decisions.
1. The Margin of Appreciation
The European System of Human Rights developed the
margin of appreciation rule. It has been pointed out that the
dialectic of the control by the European judge lies in the intention
to make room for national autonomy while preserving the
common law."0 This control can be synthesized into the notion of
margin of appreciation that defines the compatibility relationship
between domestic measures and the conventional rule."
The margin of appreciation rule is praetorian law created by
the European System on the grounds of both the subsidiarity
principle and the pluralism deemed to be the feature of the
democratic society to which the System applies.'2
As early as 1976, in its Handyside judgment, the European
Court stated:
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital
forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a
better position than the international judge to give an opinion
on the exact content of these requirements as Well as on the
"necessity" of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet
them.... Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) leaves to
the Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is
given both to the domestic legislator ("prescribed by law") and
to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to
43interpret and apply the laws in force ....
The ideological and political component of the margin of
appreciation is the observance of European diversity. As
underlined by the Strasbourg Court in the Sunday Times case:
40. FREDERIC SUDRE, DROIT EUROPEEN ET INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 211 (6th ed. 2003) ("Toute la dialectique du contr6le du juge europ~en rdside
dans le souci de faire place A l'autonomie nationale tout en pr6servant le droit commun et
se r6sume dans la notion de "marge d'apprdciation" qui vient d6finir le rapport de
compatibilit6 devant exister entre les mesures nationales et la norme conventionnelle.").
41. Id.
42. See generally, Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in
International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2005).
43. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1976).
2008]
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[T]he main purpose of the Convention is "to lay down certain
international standards to be observed by the Contracting
States in their relations with persons under their jurisdiction"
(Series A no. 5 p. 19). This does not mean that absolute
uniformity is required and, indeed, since the Contracting States
remain free to choose the measures which they consider
appropriate, the Court cannot be oblivious of the substantive or
procedural features of their respective domestic laws (see,
mutatis mutandis, judgment of 23 July 1968 in the "Belgian
Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, pp. 34-35).
44
What the Court stresses is a margin of appreciation under
European control; that is, the nature of the concerned human right
leads to stricter control and to a lesser degree of appreciation
when privacy or family relations are involved. The existence of
common legal principles also reduces the margin of appreciation of
States.
Roughly stated, this is a discretionary margin whereby the
regional Court views a particular issue through what we might
call that country's cultural, social and political "prism." Looking
through that prism, the regional Court may determine that the
domestic court is better situated to make a particular decision
and will not review that issue-and possibly not review a case.
But the device -is basically a pragmatic, post-hoc compromise
which only indirectly attacks the problem. And there has been
difficulty of consistently defining just how, when and to which
specific issues that discretion should be applied.4
The above presentation was used during a 1996 seminar at the
Organization of American States Headquarters in Washington
D.C., by the then secretary-general Cesar Gavfria, to introduce his
proposal for strengthening the Inter-American system:
Particular attention needs to be paid to cases that have already
undergone a thorough treatment by domestic courts. In these
cases, our regional system has a real opportunity to re-connect
with domestic judicial systems by articulating a specific
jurisprudence of deference to domestic proceedings. What the
regional court is entitled to review and what it should accept
from a domestic judicial proceeding needs to be clarified. While
issues of law specifically keyed to violations of the ACHR or
44. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37-38 (1979).
45. Cdsar Gaviria, Towards a New Vision of the Inter-American Human Rights
System, 4 J. OF LATIN AM. AFF. 4, 9 (1996).
[Vol. 30:247
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Charter are thoroughly reviewable by the IACHR, issues of fact
might receive greater deference. Note, too, that how a domestic
court understands a domestic law is also presumably an issue of
46fact and should be granted deference.
Needless to say, the first critics of the proposal came from the
secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR)-those who were directly involved in the question.
Christina Cerna, having the floor at the referred seminar, argued
that if the Commission had deferred to the domestic courts' fact-
finding in the thousands of cases of "disappeared" persons that
had been brought to the IACHR or those relating to persons tried
by "anonymous" judges, (I believe she is pointing to the Peruvian
cases relating to what became known as the faceless judges) no
state would ever have been condemned.47 Moreover, she suggests
that the duplication of the fact-finding aspects of the work of both
organs is merely theoretical. She argues:
The "New Vision" paper suggests that the Court "should not
replicate the IACHR's fact-finding efforts, but instead [should]
give the IACHR's fact-finding work greater deference in its
own proceedings." The paradox, however, is that currently the
majority of the fact-finding is done when the Commission
presents the case to the Court and must litigate the facts,
present witnesses and prove the allegations before the Court. A
similar procedure is not carried out to prove the facts before the
Commission, so to eliminate the Court's fact-finding powers
would be to severely cut back on the actual fact-finding being
done by the system.'
In any case, the Inter-American system created its own tool to
deal with the increasing number of petitions lodged with the
Commission.
2. The Fourth Instance Formula
The tool created by the Inter-American system is the so-
called "fourth instance formula." The fourth instance formula
prevents human rights bodies-tribunals and even quasi-judicial
organs-from reviewing local decisions as it should be the case for
a higher jurisdiction.
46. Id.
47. Christina Cerna, Clarifying a Reviewing Standard, 4 J. OF LATIN AM. AFF. 54, 55
(1996).
48. Id.
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Based on the subsidiary nature of the international human
rights supervisory mechanism, both the European and the Inter-
American systems of human rights have rejected any possibility of
formally reviewing national decisions unless they believe a
violation of a protected right is involved.49 The main idea behind
the fourth instance formula is that national jurisdictions are in a
better position to adjudicate claims according to domestic law,
whether or not they are dealing with only normative aspects or
rely on the facts."
The Inter-American system initiated the practice in Clifton
Wright's case where the Commission stated:
[I]t is not the function of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to act as a quasi-judicial fourth instance and to
review the holdings of the domestic courts of the OAS member
states. It is the function of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to act on petitions presented to it pursuant to
Articles 44 to 51 of the American Convention as regards those
States that have become parties to the Convention (Article 19
of the Statute of the IACHR, approved by Res. No. 447 of the
Ninth OAS General Assembly, 1979).51
That being so, "[o]f course the Commission cannot reverse or set
aside a judgment of a Costa Rican Court, but there is no doubt
that the Commission can state that a rule of its domestic law or a
court judgment in that country violate a human right which it
undertook to respect in a treaty to which it is internationally
bound."52
In 1996, when dealing with a case relating to Argentina where
the argument of the fourth instance formula was put forward by
the Government, the Commission recalled that "it may not be
assumed that the Commission is a national fourth instance before
which it is possible to present and resolve differences in the
49. See Wright v. Jamaica, Case 9260, -Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/88,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1 Considering 5 (1988), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/87.88eng/Jamaica9260.htm.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Schmidt v. Costa Rica, Case 9178, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 17/84,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 Observations of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 4 (1984), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/84.85eng/
CostaRica9178.htm.
258 [Vol. 30:247
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amounts awarded by the Judiciary Branch in application of the
•law ."
53
Later, the Commission resumed,
The Commission is competent to declare a petition admissible
and rule on its merits when it portrays a claim that a domestic
legal decision constitutes a disregard of the right to a fair trial,
or if it appears to violate any other right guaranteed by the
Convention. However, if it contains nothing but the allegation
that the decision was wrong or unjust in itself, the petition must
be dismissed under this formula. The Commission's task is to
ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the
States parties to the Convention, but it cannot serve as an
appellate court to examine alleged errors of internal law or fact
that may have been committed by the domestic courts acting
within their jurisdiction. Such examination would be in order
only insofar as the mistakes entailed a possible violation of any
of the rights set forth in the Convention.4
Ultimately, the Commission relies on the nature and function
of the judiciary in democracy and argues
In democratic societies, where the courts function according to
a system of powers established by the Constitution and
domestic legislation, it is for those courts to review the matters
brought before them. Where it is clear that there has been a
violation of one of the rights protected by the Convention, then
the Commission is competent to review. The Commission has
full authority to adjudicate irregularities of domestic judicial
proceedings which result in manifest violations of due process
or of any of the rights protected by the Convention."
The Commission first established the fourth instance formula
with Clifton Wright, followed by Hctor L6pez Aurelli, and finally,
produced a leading case with Marzioni. The doctrine was applied
consistently in the case of Jim~nez Rueda (Colombia),56 the report
on the admissibility of the case lodged by Juan Milla Bermddez
53. Marzioni v. Argentina, Case 11.673, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 39/96,
OEA/Ser.L./VJI/II.95, doc. 7 23 (1996), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/96eng/Argentina11673.htm.
54. Id. 51.
55. Id. IT 60-61.
56. Jimdnez v. Colombia, On Admissibility, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 4/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 11 23-27 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/96eng/Colombia.jimenez.htm.
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(Honduras),57 the inadmissibility report in the case of Garcia
Saccone (Argentina),58 and in the report according to article 51 in
the case of Tablada.5 9
The Inter-American Court also stated that with regard to the
fourth instance formula,
Lastly, in accordance with general international law, the Inter-
American Court does not act as an appellate court or a court
for judicial review of rulings handed down by the domestic
courts. All it is empowered to do in this Case is call attention to
the procedural violations of the rights enshrined in the
Convention which have injured Mr. Raymond Genie-Pefialba,
the interested party in the matter; however, it lacks jurisdiction
to remedy those violations in the domestic arena, a task, as has
been pointed out before, that falls to the Supreme Court of
Justice of Nicaragua when it disposes of the application for
judicial review which is yet to be resolved.60
Later, in the case of Street Children in Guatemala, the
government used the fourth instance formula as a preliminary
objection.6 The Court decided that the objection should be
dismissed as inadmissible because,
[T]he only preliminary objection of any substance brought by
Guatemala is essentially that alleging this Court's lack of
jurisdiction to examine as a "fourth instance" the judgment
rendered by that country's Supreme Court of Justice on July 21,
1993, which upheld the ruling of the Second District Court's
Penal Branch of the State of Guatemala of December 26, 1991,
acquitting the accused of the murder of the victims indicated by
the Commission, with a decision at the highest judicial level,
which acquired the authority of a final judgment.
57. Bermtidez v. Honduras, On Admissibility, Case 11.206, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 46/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/I/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 1$ 31-54 (1996), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/Honduras11206.htm.
58. Saccone v. Argentina, Case 11.671, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 8/98,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 $ 51-55 (1998), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/97eng/Argentina11671.htm.
59. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 $T 138-145 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
97eng/Argentina11137.htm.
60. Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30, 94 (Jan.
29, 1997), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_30_ing.pdf.
61. "Street Children" (Villagr~n-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala Case, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 32 (Sept. 11, 1997), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_32_ing.pdf.
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This Court considers that the petition submitted by the Inter-
American Commission does not seek to review the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Guatemala, but seeks a pronouncement
that the State violated several precepts of the American
Convention through the death of the aforementioned persons,
which it imputes to members of the police force of that State,
and that the State is therefore responsible.
Consequently, and as the Commission affirmed in its reply to
the brief on preliminary objections, it is a question that
concerns the merits of the case; hence the Court considers that
the objection is not preliminary, but rather a question directly
linked to the merits of the controversy. 6'
In fact, the genesis of the doctrine should be traced back to
the work of the former European Commission on Human Rights
which, in its decision in the case of Alvaro Baragiola v.
Switzerland, stated that
The Commission recalls that it is, in the first instance, for the
national authorities, and in particular the courts, to interpret
and apply domestic law.... The Commission recalls that what is
decisive is not the subjective apprehensions of the subject
concerning the impartiality required of the trial court, however
understandable, but whether, in the particular circumstances of
61
the case, his fears can be held to be objectively justified....
The European Commission held a similar view when it
rejected petitions based on alleged incorrect applications of
domestic law, or improper evaluations of facts or evidence. The
European Commission has repeatedly stated that it is not
competent to review decisions of the domestic courts unless a
violation of the European Convention is involved. In the case of
Gudmundur Gudmundson, the European Commission found that
the text of the law that imposed a special property tax was
consistent with the "permissible interferences" mentioned in
Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention, and the
alleged discrimination was merely a differential treatment with
respect to cooperative societies and joint stock companies. 
6
62. Id. IT 17-20 (emphasis in original).
63. Baragiola v. Switzerland, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 90, 103-06 (Eur. Comm'n
on H.R.).
64. Gudmundson v. Iceland, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 394, 426 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.).
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Finally, it concluded that the petition was manifestly ill-founded
and restated the "fourth instance formula" in these terms:
[E]rrors of law or fact, including errors as to the question of the
constitutionality of acts passed by a national Parliament,
committed by the domestic courts, accordingly concern the
Commission during its examination of the admissibility of the
application only in so far as they appear to involve the possible
violation of any of the rights and freedoms limitatively listed in
the Convention.... [A]n examination of the case as it has been
submitted, including an examination made ex officio does not
disclose any apparent violation of the rights and freedoms set
forth in the Convention.6
Put in this way, any review of a local judgment seems very
rare; however, a revision should take place if the concerned
supervisory organ believes that a violation of protected human
rights may be involved. In order to prevent cycling back to the
beginning, there should be a well established, well known, set of
criteria.
The Inter-American Court has explained, "As the Court has
said, the fulfillment of a constitutional requirement 'does not
always prevent a law passed by the Legislature from being in
violation of human rights'.. .. " This does not mean that the
Commission has the authority to rule as to how a legal norm is
adopted in the internal order. Rather, the authority belongs to the
competent organs of the state. What the Commission should verify
in a concrete case is whether the norm contradicts the Convention
instead of whether it contradicts the internal legal order of the
state. The authority granted to the Commission to "make
recommendations to the governments of the member states.., for
the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights
within the framework of their domestic laws and constitutional
provisions. .,67 or the obligation of the States to adopt certain
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
the rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Convention "in
accordance with their constitutional processes,"' does not
65. Id.
66. Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra
note 39 28.
67. ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 41(b).
68. Id. at art. 2.
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authorize the Commission to determine the state's adherence to
constitutional precepts in establishing internal norms.
Since 2005, the IACHR has "reiterate[d] that mere
disagreement of the petitioners with the interpretation domestic
courts have made of pertinent legal provisions does not constitute
violations of the Convention. Interpretation of the law, pertinent
proceedings, and weighing of evidence is, inter alia, the exercise of
the domestic jurisdiction function, which cannot be replaced by the
IACHR."6
III. INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS BEFORE NATIONAL TRIBUNALS
The raison d'Otre of most international law rules is that they
be applied in everyday life by concerned persons. As stated above,
however, there is no default mechanism for such a relationship to
come into being.The existence of special domestic mechanisms for the
implementation of international law rules at the local level is a
phenomenon very rarely verified, except in very specific areas,
such as integration law, human rights law, and nuclear law. In the
great majority of cases, the establishment of specific entities
expresses the peculiarities of the subject matter.
With respect to nuclear law, in an area such as safeguards, the
International Atomic Energy Agency has established relations
with local partners and domestic nuclear energy institutions.7" The
dialogue between these groups is regulated under provisions
adopted by the international organization and, in a way, has
become a sort of internal law of the international agency. It is
difficult to establish communication beyond these limits because
the specificity of the topic requires very detailed regulations and
the sovereign equality of states requires a treatment of a fair
equitable basis.
Integration mechanisms such as MERCOSUR, for instance,
do have their own rules for the blessing of national mechanisms
relating to normative or quasi-normative instruments.71
Human rights treaties, however, do not envisage any form of
downloading international decisions in specific cases to the
69. Urqufa v. Honduras, On Inadmissibility of Petition No. 644/00, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 83/05, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5 72 (2005), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2005eng/Honduras644.00eng.htm.
70. See generally International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), http://www.iaea.org.
71. See generally MERCOSUL/MERCOSUR, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb.
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operative -political, administrative, or legal-level of a country.
In such a case, it seems that there are, at least, two levels of
downloading; the first relating to the hierarchy and scope of
international legal rules in the legal order in force in a country, and
a second, dealing specifically with the decision adopted by an
organ in a given case.
The assistance of the Parliament is sometimes required in the
first level of downloading. This will depend very much on the need
to "nationalize" international.
As far as the decisions of international organs are concerned,
the experience is very rich.
A. A Regulated Procedure
In the Inter-American system, only Colombia has a domestic
law regulating all the necessary steps for the implementation and
enforcement at the domestic level of an international decision
awarding compensation or stating that compensation should be
paid.72 The regulation deals only with written decisions of both the
Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights.73 Four ministers must approve the decision; the
interior minister, the foreign affairs minister, the minister of justice
and law, and the minister of national defense. 4
The decisions of the ministers should be given within forty-
five days of the official notification of the pronouncement of an
international body in question and is subject to a verification of
compliance with all the requisites of fact and law provided for in
the political constitution and the applicable international treaties;75
to this end, attention should be paid to the evidence presented in
decisions made domestically and those before the international
instance.
The decision of the ministers against the international
decision is effective only if there is an available upper international
instance; if not, the international decision should be enforced.
After a decision has been made, a conciliation process is opened
72. Law 288/1996, Diario Oficial [D.O.] No. 42.826 (July 9, 1996) (Colom.), available
at http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/1996/ley-0288_1996.html
[hereinafter Colom. Law 288/1996].
73. Id. at art. 2(1).
74. Id. at art. 2(2).
75. Id. at cl. 3.
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where an amount is fixed to compensate the representatives of the
victim for their participation.76
B. The Suggestion of Enforcement Measures
The European system of human rights evolved from a very
broad and flexible practice where states were assumed to have the
latitude to enforce international decisions to a practice where the
Court asks specific measures that states should be adopting.
In fact, Article 46 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stipulates that state
parties must abide by the final judgmient of the Court in cases
where they are parties; the execution of the judgment will be
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe.7
The specific doctrine of the Strasbourg Tribunal was:
The Court points out that by Article 46 of the Convention the
High Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the final
judgments of the Court in any case to which they were parties,
execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It
follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a
breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not
just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just
satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the
Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate,
individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order
to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress
so far as possible the effects .... Furthermore, subject to
monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, the respondent
State remains free to choose the means by which it will
discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the
Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the
conclusions set out in the Court's judgment. 8
Further, as pointed out by Judge Caflisch, "as a matter of
principle, the obligation to implement the Court's final judgments
goes hand in hand with the respondent State's freedom to choose
the modalities of implementation.""
76. Id. at art. 3.
77. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 46, May 13, 2004, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
78. Scozzari & Giunta v. Italy, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471,528.
79. Lucius Caflisch, New Practice Regarding the Implementation of the Judgments of
the Strasbourg Court, 15 ITALY Y.B. OF INT'L L. 3, 8 (2005).
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From this original position, the Court turned to the suggestion
of the measures that the concerned state could adopt. In a case
involving Turkey, dealing with the violation of the right to justice,
the Court suggested that the most appropriate form of relief
should be to ensure that the applicant is granted a prompt retrial
by an independent and impartial tribunal."
These sort of arguments have been put forward by the ECHR
when the peculiarities of the case obliged it to do so; that is, as a
general principle, the freedom to choose the best measure remains,
but the Court feels that it is free to intervene in the sphere of
action of a concerned state and of other European organs if it
determines that it is necessary."
The ECHR began enforcing this new policy because of a
consensus reached with the Committee of Ministers on the scope
of their mutual powers and the implementation of the judgments
that were embodied in Protocol 14.' According to Judge Caflisch,
[A]s long as the Court's participation in the implementation
process is tolerated by the Contracting States and remains
confined to situations of urgency, and as long as the objective
pursued by the Court's judgment-the cessation of the
breach-cannot be attained by through remedy offered by the
respondent State, the new practice is acceptable and even
welcome. What is to be avoided is the transformation of the
exceptional practice into a routine. The Strasbourg organisms
for the protection of human rights have done well by confining
the Court's functions to the taking of judicial decisions and
entrusting the supervision of their implementation to the
Committee of Ministers, the executive arm of the Council of
Europe.83
On the same grounds, the Committee of Ministers passed a
resolution - Resolution DH(2004)3 -relating to judgments
''revealing an underlying systemic problem" and invited the Court
to identify such problems and their sources so that the Committee
and even other European organs could be in a better position to
80. Genqel v. Turkey, App. No. 53431/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 27 (2003) (translated from
French), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
81. See Caflisch, supra note 79, at 6-7.
82.. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 15-16, May 13, 2004, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
83. Caflisch, supra note 79, at 10.
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assist the concerned State in the adoption of measures necessary
for the enforcement of the judgment. '
In fact, the new policies adopted by the European system
seem to have different purposes, namely to strengthen the
effectiveness of judgments-and accordingly of the system itself-
and to reduce the caseload of the tribunal by the way of applying
precedents to all serial cases dealing with the same "systemic
problem."'
The Inter-American Court has always operated by suggesting
the adoption of specific measures. In 1999, when deciding the
merits and reparations in the case of five Chilean citizens charged
with terrorism in Peru, the Court unanimously found that "the
proceedings conducted against Mr. Jaime Francisco Sebastiin
Castillo Petruzzi... are invalid, as they were incompatible with
the American Convention on Human Rights, and so order[ed] that
the persons in question be guaranteed a new trial in which the
guarantees of due process of law are ensured."' It further ordered
that ".the State... adopt the appropriate measures to amend those
laws that this judgment has declared to be in violation of the
American Convention on Human Rights and to ensure the
enjoyment and exercise of the rights recognized in the American
Convention on Human Rights to all persons subject to its
jurisdiction, without exception."'
C. The Acknowledgement of a General Opinion
In 2005, both the United States Supreme Court and the
Argentine Supreme Court acknowledged the general opinion
created by international standards and on such grounds, ruled in
favor of changing the previous doctrine. Such an
acknowledgement, however, took different formats according to
the traditions of either jurisprudences. Namely, the United States
judgment mentioned international rules and precedents and based
the foundation of its ruling in the "evolving standards of decency"
84. Eur. Consult. Ass., Resolution Res(2004)3 of Comm. of Ministers, 114th Sess.,
(May 12, 2004), available at.https://wcd.coe.intlViewDoc.jsp?id=743257.
85. Id.
86. Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, 226(13)
(May 30, 1999), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_.52_ing.pdf.
87. Id. 226(14).
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of our society.' The Argentinian decision relied on the. binding
nature of the decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.
Both cases are relevant not only because of the subject-matter
but also because of their implications. One case dealt with the
death penalty for juveniles,89 while the other case dealt with pardon
laws and amnesties covering serious and systematic violations of
human rights."
On March 1, 2005, Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Christopher
Simmons, who at the age of seventeen committed murder, was
tried at the age of eighteen, and was sentenced to death.91 The
issue of applying the death penalty for crimes committed while
before the age of majority was permanent in U.S. judicial practice,
just as in the practice of the Inter-American System of Human
Rights.'
As early as 1987, the IACHR adopted its report in the case of
Roach and Pinkerton and came to a judgment on the existence of
an international customary rule binding the American states and
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by juveniles." Yet, the Commission accepted the
argument of the United States that there was no consensus on the
age at which majority starts.94 Shortly after this decision, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child" was adopted and its first
article stipulated that "For the purposes of the present
Convention, a child means every human being below the age of
eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child,
88. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005).
89. Id.
90. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Recurso de hecho deducido por la
defensa de Julio H6ctor Sim6n en la causa Sim6n, Julio H6ctor / privaci6n ilegitima de la
libertad, etc.," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[Fallos] (2005-328-2056) (Arg.) [hereinafter Sim6n, Julio Hdctor (Arg.)].
91. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
92. Id. at 568.
93. Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Resolution
No. 3/87, OEA/Ser.L.VII.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/86.87eng/EUU9647.htm.
94. Id.
95. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Sep. 2, 1990).
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majority is attained earlier."96 This being so, there is no more room
for decisions like the one adopted by the IACHR in 1987.
Justice Kennedy carefully analyzed all the precedents in
American judicial practice relating to the issue. He also considered
the matter from the standpoint of criminological criteria. He then
affirmed, "Our determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds
confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty."' Kennedy went on to write:
As respondent and a number of amici emphasize, Article 37 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which every country in the world has ratified save for the
United States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition on
capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under
18.... No ratifying country has entered a reservation to the
provision prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders.
Parallel prohibitions are contained in other significant
international covenants.... It is proper that we acknowledge
the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the
understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of
young people may often be a factor in the crime.... It does not
lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins
to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom.98
International human rights law influenced the Court's decision
because it demonstrated evidence of the international
community's opinion against the death penalty.
The argument made by the Argentine Supreme Court, on the
other hand, was completely different. The Argentine Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court declaring that
pardon laws adopted after a period of gross and systematic
violations of human rights in the country conflicted with the
constitution as amended in 1994," because it provided
96. Id. at art. 1.
97. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
98. Id. at 576-78.
99. Sim6n, Julio Hctor (Arg.), supra note 90.
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constitutional footing to international human rights treaties,
including the American Convention on Human Rights and, as
decided by the Court in Giroldi,'0 ° the rulings of the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights regarding its interpretation on
the scope of protected rights.' As a result of the judgment of San
Jos's tribunal in the case of Chumbipuna Aguirre et al-also
known as "Barrios Altos"-that declared the incompatibility of
amnesty laws with the American Convention," the Argentine
Supreme Court declared that the full stop law and the due
obedience law were null and void.
Here, the international human rights law argument is explicit.
The differences between the approaches of the two supreme courts
are rooted in their different traditions; their different positions
toward international law in general, specifically regarding
international human rights law; the different political
performances of the national authorities of both countries; and in
the different roles they perform in the international context.
D. When the Enforcement Creates a Sensitive Situation
The standard followed by the Argentine Supreme Court in
relying on the binding nature of the Inter-American system as a
tool for interpreting the scope of protected rights proved to be
problematic in practice. On September 18, 2003, the Inter-
American Court ruled on the merits in the case of Bulacio v.
Argentina.' Walter Bulacio, a young man of seventeen years, was
detained together with other seventy-nine people by the Federal
Police after a rock music concert and was transferred to a police
100. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 7/4/1995, "Horacio David Giroldi y otro /
recurso de casaci6n," Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n [Fallos] (1995-318-514) (Arg.).
101. Id.
102. Barrios Altos v. Peru Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 1 41 (Mar. 14,
2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75-ing.pdf ("This
Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the
establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because
they are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for
serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
execution and forced disappearance, all of them prohibited because they violate non-
derogable rights recognized by international human rights law.").
103. Sim6n, Julio Hdctor, supra note 90.
104. Bulacio v. Argentina Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100 (Sept. 18, 2003),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriecj1ling.pdf.
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station. 5 The police released the detainees in short time. Bulacio,
however, was beaten by the police; no notice of his detention was
given to his family or to the juvenile judge.'" He felt ill the day
after and was sent to a hospital. 7 It was only there that he told a
physician of how he had been beaten by the police. He died six
days later.' 8 One item of reparation related to the investigation
and punishment of those directly responsible for the human rights
violations. The government alleged that the statute of limitations
in the case had passed but the Court, invoking the case of Barrios
Altos that dealt with self-amnesty in Peru'" and Trujillo Oroza
which dealt with enforced disappearance in Bolivia,"" asserted that
there existed a situation of grave impunity and that domestic legal
rules or institutions could in no way hinder full application of
decisions by international bodies for the protection of human
rights."'
When the local tribunal accepted the statute of limitations
defense, the public prosecutor appealed the decision to the
supreme court."' The highest local tribunal analyzed the issue from
the constitutional standpoint-the one that defines its jurisdiction
ratione materiae in the given case -and pointed out that the appeal
should be rejected. The immediate effect of such a decision,
however, would be to confirm the statute of limitations
disregarding the judgment of the Inter-American Court of
September 18, 2003 that declared the international responsibility
of Argentina in the case of Bulacio."3 The Court went on to
emphasize that the Argentinian state, including the supreme court,
was under the duty to enforce its international decision."4 That
being so, to uphold the appealed decision would amount to- a
violation of human rights protected by the Inter-American system
and would engage the international responsibility of the state.
105. Id. T 3.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Barrios Altos v. Peru Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75.
110. Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92 (Feb. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/Seriec_92_ing.pdf.
111. Bulacio v. Argentina Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, 110-119.
112. Id. 3.
113. Id. 60.
114. Id. IT 60-61.
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Accordingly, the regular standards applied to statute of limitations
became inapplicable to the given case.
The supreme court, however, submitted that it did not agree
with such a restriction of the right to the defense because it came
to the state organ to ensure the due development of proceedings
without undue delay, and the prosecuted person should not be
charged with the consequences of such a delay."5 Even when the
delay is created by the steps taken by the defense counsel, it is up
to the state to re-organize the proceedings, but not the prosecuted
person."6 The Court came to the conclusion that there was no
other way of enforcing the international decision and acted
accordingly."7
IV. DISDAIN OR DEFERENCE?
At first glance, the answer is "none of them." No one
questions-at least not based on legal arguments-that
international law prevails over domestic law or that states are
under a duty to enforce their international legal obligations.
Additionally, no one questions that international tribunals have
been set up in order to satisfy the needs of international
relations-mainly among states. The creation of international
tribunals was a state decision. In actuality, all international legal
rules are law because of the will of the states. It is not surprising
then, that decisions adopted by such tribunals are deemed to be
enforced in the local context.
In some cases, one of the requisites to seize international
tribunals is the exhaustion of local remedies; in other words, the
highest domestic instance available must have made a ruling and
that ruling did not meet international standards. In regular
proceedings, a national supreme court's judgment is considered
proof of the exhaustion of local remedies and because of this res
judicata is only preliminary. In fact, it becomes firm and lasting
whenever there is no further possibility of seizing an international
instance or whenever such instance has also been exhausted.
Consequently, the notion of res judicata is two-fold.
The international tribunal examines how local organs satisfy
the international obligations of the state but is not allowed to take
115. See id. 3.
116. Id.
117. See id. ' 48.
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care of the state's duties. International instances should act as a
tool for the strengthening of local conditions, including democracy
and democratic institutions, and not as their substitutes.
In order to deal with aspects closely linked to domestic
competences, international tribunals developed two different
techniques: the margin of appreciation and the fourth instance
formula.
Once international decisions are adopted, they must be
downloaded at a domestic level. The ways in which this operation
takes place are different. The principle of freedom is restricted
only if the given system has special requirements.
Since international tribunals do not belong to an
"international judiciary," disagreement amongst the international
decision and the local operator in charge of implementing the
decision on a point of law may be understood as a violation of a
given treaty. International judges, their capacities, the. procedures
associated with their nominations and elections, and judicial
accountability become particularly important as the possibility of
this sort of disagreement becomes more frequent as a result of the
increasing judicialization of international controversies. "8 The
chapter dealing with the above issues should be drafted together
with the relationship between national and international courts.
118. See generally TERRIS, supra note 23.
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